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Criminal Justice Decision Making as a Stratification
Process: The Role of Race and Stratification Resources
in Pretrial Release
Celesta A. Albonetti,1 Robert M. Ha user,2 John Hagan,3 and

llene H. Nagel4
Our purpose is to bridge the criminal justice and stratification research literatures
and to pursue the argument that homologous structural principles stratify alloca

tion processes across central institutions of American society. The principle

observed here in the making of bail decisions, as in earlier studies of the allocation
of earnings, is that stratification resources operate to the greater advantage of

whites than blacks. The operation of this principle is established through the
estimation of covariance structure models of pretrial release decisions affecting

5660 defendants in 10 federal courts. Education and income are treated in this

study as observed components of a composite construct, stratification resources,
which works to the greater advantage of whites. Prior record is also found to
operate to the greater advantage of whites. Two further variables, dangerousness
and community ties, increase bail severity among blacks and whites. While the
effect of community ties has been legally legitimized since the Bail Reform Act
of 1966, the effect of dangerousness was not so legitimized until the Bail Reform
Act of 1984. However, because our data precede the latter act, they confirm that
this act simply reinstitutionalized earlier practice. Meanwhile, our race-specific
findings may explain why although this and earlier studies find negligible main

effects of race on criminal justice outcomes, black Americans nonetheless per
ceive more criminal injustice than do whites. In the criminal justice system, as
in other spheres of American society, whites receive a better return on their

resources, but our findings that the statutory severity of the offense and

dangerousness work to the relative disadvantage of white defendants challenges
conflict and labeling theory's one-dimensional characterization of black defen
dant disadvantage.

KEY WORDS: stratification resources; race-specific effects; discretion; pretrial

release decision; covariance model.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Are there structural principles that stratify allocation processes across

the central institutions of American society? Status attainment and class
analysis traditions of sociological research both suggest affirmative answers
to this question. With regard to the criminal justice system, both traditions

make their cases for such an assumption in intriguing ways. The status
attainment tradition notes a remarkable regularity in the way respondents
rank the seriousness of crimes and punishments, a regularity that parallels
rankings of occupational prestige (Rossi et al, 1974; Blumstein et al., 1983).
The class analysis tradition notes that it was not until the nineteenth century
and the successful establishment of capitalist modes of production that
fixed periods of imprisonment proportional to the ranked seriousness of
crimes became a guiding principle of criminal punishment (Humphries and
Greenberg, 1984). Of course, both traditions can also note the parallel
emphasis placed on equality of treatment in the criminal justice system
(e.g., Balbus, 1977) and on equality of opportunity in the wider economy
(e.g., Featherman and Hauser, 1978). But it is the attention given to the
patterning of inequalities relative to such expectations that makes both
these traditions of sociological research of particular interest in the study
of criminal justice decision making, as a stratification system guided by
structural principles like those of other institutions of allocation.5
The logic of the above arguments is not in question, nor is the import
ance of establishing a correspondence between criminal justice decision
making and other stratification systems. However, doing so requires greater
evidence of similar structuring principles, particularly with regard to pat
terned inequalities, than currently exists in the criminal justice research
literature. The problem may be that studies of criminal justice decision
making have focused with rather inconsistent results, for example, on issues
of racial inequality, while they have neglected the connection of race to
other aspects of the stratification process (but see Lizotte, 1978; Hagan and
Bumiller, 1983).
A convincing demonstration that homologous structural principles
underlie criminal justice decision making and other allocation processes
requires a combined consideration of race and other stratification resources
(Farnworth and Horan, 1980). One of the most intriguing findings in the
5 For purposes of illustration, the education system is seen as an institution allocating credentials
that serve to legitimate practice within fields of expertise. Similarly, the criminal justice system

can be seen as an institution allocating justice as prescribed by substantive and procedural
law within broad discretionary limits. At the pretrial release decision, magistrates dispense
levels of liberty with the most severe measure of punitiveness, that of the denial of liberty
during pretrial processing.
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stratification literature is that black males receive lower returns in income

for their educational achievements than do whites (Weiss, 1970; Siegel,
1965; Duncan, 1969; Wright, 1978). Although there is some evidence of
change in these patterns over time (Hout, 1984; Featherman and Hauser,
1978; Wilson, 1978), the unequal returns that blacks and whites historically
have received on their resources remains as evidence of an important
structural principle at work in the stratification of American society. Below

we look for evidence of the operation of such a principle at an early stage
of the criminal justice process, the making of pretrial release decisions.
First, however, we must explore the nature of these decisions and our
approach to the analysis of this stratification process.
2. PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISIONS

Pretrial release decisions are the culmination of a low-visibility alloca

tion process. Although these decisions receive little public attention,
especially at the federal level, it is increasingly apparent that these early
determinations exert a substantial effect on subsequent decisions of greater

visibility. For example, Goldkamp (1979; see also Hagan et al., 1980; Lizotte,
1978) found that defendants detained in jail during pretrial stages of felony
prosecution received more severe sentences. It is argued that being detained

in jail decreases a defendant's ability to build a defense and that the stigma
of detainment itself further disdvantages defendants, especially injury trials.
Research has sought, therefore, to determine what types of defendants are
most likely to be detained prior to trial, focusing particularly on the role
of legal and extralegal attributes in the making of these decisions. Below
we operationalize two extralegal attributes, education and income, as
indicators of a construct we will call stratification resources.6 Following the
lead of earlier stratification research, our interest is in examining the possible
interaction of race with these stratification resources and other legal and
extralegal variables in structuring the allocation of pretrial release. Our
guiding hypothesis reflects the broader structural principle noted above:
that stratification resources operate to the greater advantage of whites than
blacks. Before we explore this hypothesis further, however, we must intro
duce a debate about bail that underwrites the current legislative definition
of criteria that are legally relevant to pretrial release decisions.
Critics of America's early and largely cash bail system have argued
that the only legal function of bail was to assure the return of the accused
6We call this construct variable stratification resources in a conscious effort to bridge the status

attainment and class analysis traditions. We could have called this variable status or class
resources. The point is that stratification resources can be regarded as either status or class
resources or both.
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for subsequent hearings (Beeley, 1927; Morse and Beattie, 1932; Foote,
1954,1959). Proponents of this position, then and now, insist that preventive
detention prior to trial violates the constitutional rights of the accused and

is contrary to the principles of the presumption of innocence. Opponents
of this position (Mitchell, 1969; Hess, 1971) maintain that the legitimate
function of bail is twofold: to assure the appearance of the accused and to
protect the community from dangerous defendants.
An analysis of Supreme Court decisions of the 1950s and early 1960s
reveals that other than a broadly conceived "right to bail" in noncapital
cases prior to trial, no real judicial consensus on pretrial release was
established.7 The form of bail and the criteria to be considered in its
determination remained uncertain. Congress entered the debate with the
passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966.8 This act attempted to reform the
excessive use of cash bail in the federal courts by making the defendant's
appearance at trial, rather than his or her possible "danger to the com
munity" during the pretrial period, the only factor to be considered in
setting bail. Defendant's dangerousness could be used as a criterion in
deciding bail in the special case of a capital offense charge.
The Bail Reform Act of 19849 reversed much of this thinking by
providing for the inclusion of information on the defendant's potential
dangerousness to the community in deciding the severity of bail decisions.
The effect of this legislation was explicitly to give bail decision making the
dual function described above, encompassing both a concern for flight risk
and protection of the community from the potential dangerousness of the
7This debate over the legitimate function of bail is reflected in two landmark cases heard by
the Supreme Court in 1951. In Stack v. Boyle (72 S. Ct. 1) and Carlson v. London (72 S. Ct.

525) the majority opinions laid out contradictory criteria for deciding bail and have sub
sequently been the source of support for the two opposing views identified. To support the
dual assertion that the defendant does not have a constitutional right to bail and that the use
of bail for preventive detention is legitimate, Mitchell (1969) and Hess (1971) cite the opinion
delivered in Carlson v. London. On the other hand, Foote (1954), Harvard Law Review (1966),

Fabricant (1969), Tribe (1970), and Borman (1971) rely on the decision in Stack v. Boyle to
argue for a right to bail while also insisting that preventive detention is unconstitutional. The
cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1951 are extensions of these two views. In Herzog

v. U.S. (1955), Reynolds v. U.S. (1959), Brady v. U.S. (1961), Brady v. U.S. (1962), and
Fernandez v. U.S. (1961) the Supreme Court argued the role of bail is that of assuring
appearance. On the other hand, decisions in Carbo v. U.S. (1962), Sellars v. U.S. (1968), and
Russell v. U.S. (1968) maintained that threat to the community is a legitimate criterion in the
determination of pretrial release decisions. The court relied on the defendant's prior record

and use of a weapon as indicators of dangerousness. We have relied on Goldkamp's (1979)
earlier research in presenting the history of the debate as it has been expressed in court

decisions relevant for this research. See footnote 12 for most recent decisions.

sThe Bail Reform Act of 1966 Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214
'The Bail Reform Act of 1984 Pub. L. No. 94-473, 98 Stat, 1976.
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released defendant. This dual function is reinforced by the recent Supreme
Court decision in U.S. v. Salerno.10 The majority opinion in this case held
that preventive detention prior to trial is not unconstitutional, because
"Congress formulated the detention provisions not as punishment for
dangerous individuals, but as a potential solution to the pressing societal
problem of crime committed by persons on release." By this decision the
Supreme Court reversed the lower Court of Appeal's decision (3142) that
"authorization of pretrial detention on the ground of future dangerousness
is facially unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's substan
tive due process guarantee."
While it is clear that the 1984 act and the recent Supreme Court decision
in Salerno mark a shift in the formal legal functions of bail, it is not so
clear that lower-court practices were free of this dual function prior to these

higher-court and legislative developments. Indeed, it may well be as
anthropologist Paul Bohannon (1965) suggested some time ago, that such
changes only reinstitutionalize existing practices. That is, law may move
from the bottom up, as well as from the top down. As we note further
below, examination of court practices after the 1966 act, but before the
1984 act, can provide a test of this possibility. First, however, we review
prior research on bail decision making.
3. PRIOR RESEARCH

Early studies of pretrial release sought to document a widespread and
ill-founded reliance on cash bail and its differential impact on the poor.
An apparently discriminatory impact of cash bail on the poor was often
demonstrated, and in the process a range of legal and extralegal variables
was identified that must be included in any properly specified model of
pretrial release decisions. For example, Beeley (1927) found that risk of
nonappearance was unrelated to conditions of pretrial release but that
access to freedom was largely a function of defendants' financial resources.
Foote (1954) and Alexander et aL (1958) similarly found cash bail to be
the most frequent condition of release. Although both of these studies found

a relationship between charge and bail outcome, Foote's analysis again
indicated that the defendant's economic status was related to pretrial

detention.

The above findings suggested economic discrimination and led to an
interest among policy makers in determining which defendant attributes, if
any, were empirically linked to subsequent non-appearance, or "flight risk"

(see Ares et al., 1966; Freed and Wald, 1964). The results of these efforts
10 U.S. v. Salerno 794 F. 2d. 64 (2d. cir), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. (1986).
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to develop measures of flight risk based on defendant attributes, such as
ties to the community, were inconclusive (see Gottfredson, 1981; Feeley

and McNaughton, 1974; Clarke et al, 1976; Landes, 1973, 1974;
Christenson, 1971). Nonetheless, consideration of "community ties"
achieved a legal status in the determination pretrial release decisions through
the 1966 Bail Reform Act and subsequent reform legislation. This is reflected
in our treatment of community ties in the analysis below.

Another group of studies implicitly or explicitly employs the criteria
of the 1966 Bail Reform Act to distinguish between legal and extralegal
determinants of pretrial release decisions. The earlier of these studies are
primarily descriptive and rely on frequencies and percentage differences.
Nonetheless, Bynum (1977) reports that net of offense charged and prior
record, defendant's income is associated with nonfinancial release (i.e.,
release on recognizance, or ROR). Fleming's study of Detroit and Baltimore
found relationships between contextual factors, such as the social, political,
and organizational characteristics of local government, and the use of cash
bail. A comparison across 20 jurisdictions from 1962 to 1971 by Thomas
(1976) reveals a decrease in the use of preventive detention and an increase
in the use of ROR.

Turning to studies utilizing multivariate techniques, Goldkamp (1979)
found that controlling for income-, job-, and asset-related variables, offense
seriousness and defendant's prior record had a significant impact on release
decisions. However, community ties did not have a significant effect. Nagel
(1983) also found charge severity to have a significant effect on release
decisions, while extralegal variables, including race and social class, had
only minor effects. More specifically, Nagel reported that race had no
significant effect on the ROR decision and only a small effect on the bail
amount and the decision to offer a cash alternative. Nagel (1983, p. 506)
concluded that "in this jurisdiction, for this sample during the period

studied, age, race, sex and education predict poorly pretrial release
decisions." The finding of negligible extralegal effects and the cautious
contextualization of these results are worthy of special note.
Finally, Farnworth and Horan (1980) use a covariance model to test
the interaction of race with social background and procedural factors on
the amount of bond. Relying on a large (N = 12,454) sample of court cases
processed in the North Carolina Court system from January 1967 through
April 1969, they found that, regardless of race, defendants in the lower
occupational levels receive higher bond amounts. However, their analysis
also reveals race-specific effects. They found (1980, p. 392) that "older white
defendants and whites who are charged with more serious offenses are liable

to greater bond charges." Furthermore, the data indicate that white defen
dants who retain private counsel receive a lower amount of bond than black
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defendants. The race interaction effects reported by Farnworth and Horan
(1980) are important, but they must be interpreted with caution. We have
noted extensive and lengthy judicial and legislative debates regarding the
functions of bail. These debates underline the likelihood that Farnworth

and Horan's models of bail decision making are misspecified in two impor
tant ways: by failing to include information on the defendant's dangerous
ness to the community upon release and information on the defendant's
likelihood of jumping bail. Failing to include these variables overlooks three

decades of debate over the variables legally relevant to the bail decision
and fails to address the question of whether the effect of legally relevant
variables varies with defendant's race. We return to this study below since
their research interests overlap with our own.
The research literature briefly reviewed covers a period of over 30 years,

focusing primarily on policy issues (cf. Goldkamp, 1981, 1985, 1987) that

followed from the legislative and judicial actions described above. Of
perhaps greatest interest is the fact that community ties scales were
developed in an attempt to provide an objective method of estimating flight

risk and, thereby, to reduce inappropriate judicial reliance on extralegal
criteria in determining pretrial release. These efforts failed to produce
reliable and valid predictive scales (Goldkamp, 1983,1985), but the concept
of community ties has nonetheless become a legally sanctioned part of the
decision-making process. Meanwhile, the research literature indicates that
there is a wide latitude of discretion in making pretrial release decisions,
with the consequence that there is detainment of defendants in no particular

relation to the flight risk they pose. However, the exact role of race and
other stratification resources, along with a range of other legal and extralegal

variables identified above, including dangerousness, remains unclear.
4. PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISIONS IN TEN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS

This research extends the analysis of pretrial release decisions by
examining the interplay of race, stratification resources, and a number of
other legal and extralegal variables. In this sense our research is consistent
with the "legal realist" tradition of sociolegal research (see Nagel, 1983;
Stryker et al., 1983), a tradition which seeks to draw a distinction between
the "law in action" and the "law in the books." Methodologically, this
tradition is expressed in research that examines the main effects of legal
(the law in the books) and extralegal (the law in action) variables on judicial
decisions.

Our research also goes beyond traditional legal realist scholarship by
considering a more subtle role that extralegal variables may play in allocating
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judicial decisions. Our guiding hypothesis, derived from a structural prin
ciple thought to operate across stratification systems, is that race of defen
dant does not enter judicial decisions simply as a main effect but, rather,
in interaction with stratification resources and other legal and extralegal
variables. An implication of this guiding hypothesis is that the effects of
stratification resources and other variables are at least partially contingent
on the race of defendants. Put another way, it may be that the full effects
of extralegal variables such as race and other stratification resources do not
appear until one specifies interactions between legal and extralegal variables

(Miethe and Moore, 1986). Of course, identification of such interaction
effects not only would be important for policy purposes, but also, as we
have emphasized, would illustrate a homology across stratification systems
that has not previously been observed.
Since Farnworth and Horan (1980) also have explored race and status
interactions in bail decision making, it is important that we note theoretical

and methodological differences in our approaches, which we believe serve
to strengthen the validity of our findings. First, our covariance models
include more complete measures of social background: the defendant's
educational level and income. More importantly, our estimates are obtained
controlling for two variables, dangerousness and flight risk, that we have
seen are of theoretical interest to the ongoing debate over the legal function

of bail. We include three measures of community ties in addition to a

measure of whether the defendant has a record of jumping bail. The
importance of these variables is noted in their main effects (see Table II),
indicating their importance as control variables in testing for race interaction

effects with social background factors. Finally, we should note, of course,
that our research includes 10 federal court settings, while Farnworth and
Horan considered only a single state. We move now to a description of our
data and the specification of a structural equation model of pretrial release
decisions.
5. THE DATA

The data11 consist of all 5660 male felony defendants processed from
1974 through 1977 in 10 federal district courts which include the following

cities: Eastern and Southern New York (Brooklyn and Manhattan), North

ern Illinois (Chicago), Eastern Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), Maryland
(Baltimore), Northern Texas (Dallas), Western Missouri (Kansas City),
Northern Georgia (Atlanta), Central California (Los Angeles), and Eastern
Michigan (Detroit). The data were collected with special provisions for
"Data were provided by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts with the assistance of Guy
Willetts, Chief of Probation of the U.S. Courts, and by the National Institute of Mental Health.
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quality control and comprehensiveness made possible through a mandate
of Title II of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 to evaluate pretrial service

agencies established under this Act. The provisions of the evaluation
included that a population of cases was to be collected during this period.
Interviews conducted by two of the authors of this paper with administrators

of the pretrial service agencies established in each of these cities, as well
as with other court personnel, indicated that full cooperation was achieved
in the data collection effort.

6. STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL OF PRETRIAL
RELEASE DECISIONS

The structural equation model of pretrial release decisions that we

consider in this paper is specified and estimated within the LISREL
framework of Jôreskog and Sôrbom (Jôreskog, 1973; Jôreskog and Sôrbom,

1981a, b). This general model allows the simultaneous specification of a
model linking constructs to indicators and a structural equation model
stating the causal relationships among these variables. Two constructs
introduced above, stratification resources and community ties, are of par
ticular importance to our analysis. Stratification resources is an extralegal
variable that forms an essential link to the larger stratification literature.
Community ties is a legal variable that is of steadily increasing policy
relevance. We have represented these as outcomes of multiple components
within the LISREL model. Our model does not contain any latent or
unobservable variables; within a single population it merely provides a way
to organize and present a recursive model in observed variables. The LISREL
specification does provide additional statistical power in our cross-racial
comparisons of the pretrial detention decision.
Below we model determinants of pretrial release as a structure involving

the defendants' educational level (£,), income (£2), length of residence (£¡),
marital status (£,), employment status (|3), history of bail jumping (&),
dangerousness to the community (f7), type of crime (f8), prior felony
convictions (£>), race (f10), stratification resources (77,), community ties
(t72), and statutory seriousness of the crime (tj3). More specifically, the
restrictiveness of the pretrial release decision, or in other words bail severity

(774), is modeled as an allocation decision involving a set of exogenous
variables, two composite constructs, and one additional endogenous vari
able. Figure 1 depicts our model of pretrial release decisions, based on the
following set of equations:

Vi = + 7i,2& (1)
T?2 = 72,3 6 + 72.4Í4+ 72,5 £s (2)
V3 ~ 73,7^7 + 73,8+ 73,9^9 +¿3 (3 )
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Fig. 1. Path model of the determinants of bail decision making.

Vi - Pi.íVl + pA.lVl + 74,6^6 + 74,7^7 + Tuifs + 74,9& + 74,10^10+ PajVí + U

(4)
where

f, = 1 if defendant completed high school or its equivalent,
= 0 if defendant did not complete high school;
£2 = defendant's yearly income;
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& = defendant's months of residence in the community;
£4 = 1 if defendant is married or in common-law relationship,

= 0 if defendant is single, divorced or widowed;
£5 = 1 if defendant is employed,

= 0 if defendant is unemployed;
= 1 if defendant has previously jumped bail,
= 0 if defendant has not jumped bail;
£7=1 if defendant ever used a weapon in a crime—dangerous,
= 0 if defendant has not used a weapon—not dangerous;
& = 1 is defendant is charged with white-collar crime,
= 0 if defendant is charged with conventional crime;
£9 = 1 if defendant has a record of adult felony convictions,

= 0 if defendant has no prior adult felonies;
£10 = 1 if defendant is black,

= 0 is defendant is white;
tj3 = maximum sentence defendant is exposed to by statute; and
t}4 = 1 if defendant receives personal recognizance,
= 2 unsecured bond,
= 3 unsecured bond plus supervision,
= 4 bail contingent on a 10% cash deposit,
= 5 bail contingent on a 10% cash deposit plus supervision,
= 6 bail with collateral or collateral plus supervision,
= 7 bail contingent on a surety bond, or
= 8 bail contingent on a surety bond plus supervision,
= 9 if defendant is denied bail.

Note that the final endogenous variable, bail severity (r/4), is an ordinal
variable coded from least to most restrictive in terms of the conditions

established for pretrial release or its denial. This approximates an interval
scale of the severity of this decision.
Some additional detail is necessary about the variables included in our
analysis. We have already indicated that stratification resources is a com
posite that is operationalized as a linear function of education and income.
Although the Bail Reform Act of 1966 allowed consideration of financial
resources in setting bail conditions, it did so for the purpose of establishing
community ties. Community ties is operationalized as a separate construct
that is measured as a linear function of length of residence, marital status,
and employment. So any effect of stratification resources that is found net
of the effect of community ties and other legal variables included in our
model can be considered extralegal. Specifying our model with these con
structs, we expect that both the composite stratification resources (77,) and
community ties (172) cause bail severity (rj4), with the former mediating the
extralegal effects of education (£,) and income (£,), and the latter mediating
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the legal efiects of length of residence (|3), marital status (f4), and employ
ment status (£5).

In the analysis that follows, y,_, and y2,3 are fixed equal to 1.00 for
purposes of normalization (see Bielby et al., 1977). When the coefficients
leading to stratification resources and community ties, respectively, are

determined in models with composite variables such as ours, the two
composite variables are known exactly. Furthermore, the variables cause
the composite variables as indicated, rather than being caused by the latent
construct, as in factor analysis.

The remaining five exogenous variables in the model allow us to
examine the net effect of information thought to affect the bail decision.
These variables are dichotomies indicating whether the defendant has ever
jumped bail (f6), is dangerous in the sense of having used a weapon (f,),
has previous adult felony convictions (f9), has committed a white-collar
crime (£8), and is black (£I0). Only the white-collar crime variable requires
further comment. We include this variable because of the uncertainty in

the literature (see Hagan et al., 1980; Wheeler et al, 1982; Hagan and

Parker, 1985) as to whether these offenses result in lenient treatment and
because this variable provides another kind of stratification measure for
our analysis. We developed this measure by first listing offenses against the

United States Code that might plausibly fall within the category of white
collar crime. We then asked United States Attorneys and their Assistants
in the 10 districts whether they would designate these offenses as such. On

this basis 31 offenses were consensually identified as white-collar, and the
remainder were designated as conventional crimes.12
,2A short description of these ofienses follows: 15 U.S.C. Section 1 (1976) (antitrust violations);
18 U.S.C. Sections 152, 201, 209, 287, 643, 648, 657, 658, 664, 1001, 1005, 1006, 1010, 1012,
1014,1341,1343 (bankruptcy—concealment of assets, false oaths and claims, bribery; bribery,
graft, and conflicts of interest—bribery of public officials and witnesses; bribery, graft, and

conflicts of interest—salary of government officials and employees payable only by U.S.;
bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest—offer to procure public office; claims and services
in matters affecting the government—false or fraudulent claims; embezzlement and theft—
accounting for public money; embezzlement and theft—custodians, generally misusing funds;

embezzlement and theft—lending, credit, and insurance institutions; embezzlement and
theft—property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agencies; embezzlement and theft—theft

or embezzlement from employee benefit plan; fraud and false statements—statements or
entries generally; fraud and false statements—statements or entries generally; fraud and
false statements—bank entries, reports, or false transactions; fraud and false statements—
federal crime institutions entries, reports, and transactions; fraud and false statements—HUD

and FHA transactions; fraud and false statements—loan and credit applications generally,
also renewals and discounts, crop insurance; mail fraud—frauds and swindles, mail fraud—
fictitious name or address; mail fraud—fraud by wire, radio, or television respectively); 26
U.S.C. Sections 7201, 7203, 7206 (1976) (attempt to evade or defeat tax, failing to file tax
return, fraud and false statements, respectively); 29 U.S.C. Section 501 (1976) (fraudulent
acceptance of payments—veterans' benefits).
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In addition to the two eta variables, stratification resources and com
munity ties, the model includes two additional endogenous variables, statu
tory seriousness of the offense (i?3) and bail severity (ij4). Statutory serious

ness is measured by the maximum prison sentence provided in the United
States Code for the charge initially placed against the offender. This is
obviously a legal variable, while any effect of being charged with a white
collar offense net of statutory seriousness and the other legal variables
included in our model is clearly extralegal. As indicated earlier, the final
endogenous variable in the model is an approximate interval ordering from
least to most severe in the restrictiveness of the pretrial release decision or,

in other words, a measure of bail severity.
The path coefficient (04>3) estimating the effect of statutory seriousness
on bail severity is specified because it frequently is assumed that the severity
of the potential sanction is an element involved in the defendant's consider
ation of flight and should, therefore, be a factor considered in the determina

tion of pretrial release conditions. The model specifies main effects of
stratification resources and community ties on bail severity. The remaining
five exogenous variables, type of charge, record of bail jumping, prior felony

convictions, race, and dangerousness, are allowed to affect bail severity
directly. Only dangerousness, type of charge, and prior record are allowed
also to affect bail severity indirectly through the endogenous variable statu
tory seriousness of the offense.
We allow type of offense to affect statutory severity (173) from an interest

in determining if being charged with a white-collar offense affects bail
severity through statutory seriousness, as a result of the less severe sanctions
specified by law for this type of crime. As indicated above, inclusion of this

indirect influence of type charge on bail severity assures that the further
estimation of the direct effect (£4>8) of being charged with a white-collar
offense on bail severity is not contaminated by the differential statutory
seriousness of these crimes. The direct effect of type of offense on bail
severity is, in this sense, extralegal.

The dangerousness of the defendant, as indicated by use of a weapon
in this or earlier crimes, is specified also in the model as a main effect on
bail severity (-y4-7). Recall that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was explicit in

indicating that dangerousness of the defendant is an extralegal criterion in
determining pretrial release.13 As noted earlier, our second concern is
"Since the Bail Reform Act of 1966, a number of case decisions have served to clarify further
the purpose of bail, each consistent with the act. The following are only a sampling of such
cases: U.S. v. Parr, U.S. v. Cramer, U.S. v. Smith, U.S. v. Branson, Bell v. Wolfish, and U.S.
v. Edwards, Schall v. Martin. In addition, it should be noted that the additional complexity
in the flight risk and danger to the community debate provided by the Bail Reform Act of
1984 does not apply to the analysis here since the data are of defendants processed from
1974 to 1977.
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whether there is evidence indicating that prior to the Bail Reform Act of

1984 magistrates routinely included information on the defendant's
dangerousness in deciding the outcome severity of the bail decision at a
time during which such information was legislatively prohibited. Com
parison of the coefficients for dangerousness and community ties provides
a measure of the relative importance placed on these two types of informa
tion in light of the contradictory mandates of the two Bail Reform Acts.
7. RESULTS

We turn now to a discussion of the results of our data analysis. This
discussion is organized around an examination of the direction and magni
tude of each estimated coefficient and an examination of a series of chi

square tests of invariance of selected parameter estimates across racial
groups. The latter, of course, reflects our interest in the variable influence

of stratification resources and other legal and extralegal variables across
these groups. First, however, we consider the full sample of white and black
defendants.

Table I is the correlation matrix used in estimating the LISREL model
for the 5660 white and black male felony defendants processed through the

Table I. Correlation Matrix for the Total Sample of Felony Male Defendants in Ten Federal
District Courts"
ft

£1

ft

ft

ft

1.00

(2

0.24

1.00

ft

0.01

0.12

1.00

u
(s

0.03

0.24

0.05

1.00

0.17

0.77

0.08

0.17

-0.10

-0.11

-0.09

-0.03

-0.10

£7

-0.03

-0.06

-0.02

-0.02

-0.05

0.24

0.21

0.10

0.08

ft

ft

ft

fto

1?3

14

1.00

ft
£s

ft

ft

0.14

1.00
-0.05
-0.07

1.00

-0.06

1.00

&
fio

-0.11

-0.13

-0.07

-0.05

-0.11

0.17

0.11

-0.10

1.00

-0.16

-0.26

-0.01

-0.06

-0.14

0.08

0.02

-0.12

0.03

1.00

%

-0.06

-0.08

-0.04

-0.08

-0.05

0.22

0.08

0.03

0.04

1.00

Vi

-0.10

-0.11

-0.15

-0.07

-0.10

0.03

0.14

1.00

in means'"

-0.16

-0.23

-0.01

-0.06

-0.14

0.03

0.03

SD

-0.89

21.57

6.75

0.29

-0.16

0.22

0.17

-0.16

0.18

0.08

0.02

-0.12

0.03

0.38

0.17

Difference
0.99

0.49

0.48

0.33

2.02

—

—

"Variables: f, (educational level), éi (income level), (length of residence), ¿4 (marital status), f5
(employment status), ft (jumped bail), f7 (dangerousness), (s (white-collar crime), (prior record), f,0
(race), t¡j (statutory seriousness), and i)4 (severity of bail outcome).
''The mean of each variable in the analysis was lost and cannot be generated. By way of providing some
information on the variable means we regressed dependent's race on each variable, providing a difference
of means across the two groups. This information is recorded for convenience.
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Table n. LISREL Estimates, z Values, and Standardized Coefficients for Parameters in Model
1 Estimated on Pooled Data"

Endogenous variable
Vi V2 % Vi

(stratification (community (statutory (bail
resources) ties) severity) severity)
Exogenous variable
(education) 1.00

(income) 0.97
0.08
0.11

(0.32)
(length of residence)

1.00

0.84

£, (marital status)

0.58
0.24

(3.17)*
(employment status)

0.92
0.38

(3.33)**

(jumped bail)

0.58
0.06

(4.68)**
(dangerousness)

2.46

2.12

0.06

0.13

(4.87)**
(type of ofiense)

-4.33
-0.21

(16.29)**
f9 (prior record)

0.60

-0.07

(5.16)**

-0.01

1.62

-0.001

0.11

(0.03)
fio (race)

(10.25)**

(8.98)**

0.06

-0.08

0.005

-0.02

(0.36)

(1.14)

Endogenous variable
-ql (stratification resources)

-0.19
-0.06

(4.61)**
7/2 (community ties)

-0.42

-0.18

(11.74)**
7j3 (statutory severity)

0.04

0.09

(7.46)**
Overall model x2 - 32.06
df = 6
P = 0.000

"Order of reported findings: L1SREL estimates, standardized coefficients, z values.
*P<0.01.

**P<0.001.
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10 federal district courts. Table II presents the estimated path coefficients
and their associated levels of statistical significance. We consider the legal
effects first. The latent variable community ties has the legally expected
effect of reducing bail severity (j84>2 = -0.42, P< 0.001). This is as allowed
by the Bail Reform Act of 1966. Also, the path indicates that defendants
with records of jumping bail are likely to receive more severe bail conditions

(74.6 = 0-58, P< 0.001), as are also defendants with prior felony records
(y4]9 = 1.62, PcO.OOl).
We turn now to extralegal influences on pretrial release decisions. The
latent variable stratification resources exerts a considerable and statistically

significant direct effect (/34>) = -0.19, P < 0.001) on bail severity. As expec
ted, but contrary to the presumed purposes of the bail reform efforts, bail
severity increases with declining stratification resources. Race, on the other

hand, does not significantly influence (y410=-0.08, P> 0.05) pretrial
release. We return to this finding below. Again contrary to the expressed
intent of the Bail Reform Act, our measure of dangerousness increases bail

severity (y4j7 = 2.12, P<0.001). These data indicate that dangerousness
clearly influenced bail severity before the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and U.S.

v. Salerno (1986) legitimized consideration of this factor.
Finally, being charged with a white-collar crime both directly (y4>8 =
-0.60, P< 0.001) and indirectly benefits the defendant in terms of reduced
bail severity. The indirect effect is through the lower statutory seriousness

of white-collar offenses (y3>8 = -4.33, P< 0.001). At least the former effect
can be considered extralegal, as it occurs independent of the statutory effect.
So far we have seen that extralegal as well as legal variables significantly

affect the allocation of pretrial release decisions. These findings constitute
an advance in the sense of estimating the effects of stratification resources

and community ties as composite constructs in models of pretrial release
decisions, and they identify a broader range of extralegal effects on pretrial

release decisions than previously has been established. However, these
findings do not contradict earlier studies in any explicit way. It is of particular

interest that earlier studies have also found negligible main effects of race
in bail decision making. However, we move now to the examination of the
effects of stratification resources and other legal and extralegal variables
across racial groups as a means of testing the structural principle that is
central to this paper, namely, that stratification resources and other variables
interact with defendant's race in their effect on bail severity. To pursue this
analysis, the population of felony defendants is split into whites and blacks
and Model 1 is examined within each group, with the model modified only
to the extent of excluding race as an exogenous variable.
Tables III and IV present the correlation matrices for the 2785 black
and 2875 white male felony defendants, respectively. Table V indicates the
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Table III. Correlation Matrix for Black Male Felony Defendants in Ten Federal District
Courts"

£l f2 ft ^4 fs ft ft ft ft V3 V4
ft 100
f2 0.18 1.00
£, 0.02 0.09 1.00
f4 0.03 0.20 -0.05 1.00
f5 0.14 0.79 0.06 0.16 1.00
& -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.03 -0.12 1.00
g7 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 1.00

£8 0.18 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 1.00
f9 -0.06 -0.10 0.07 -0.04 -0.08 0.14 0.08 -0.06 1.00
173 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 0.11 -0.18 0.02 1.00
tj. -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 -0.04 -0.11 0.08 0.18 -0.11 0.10 0.14 1.00
"Variables: f, (educational level), f2 (income level), f3 (length of residence), £, (marital
status), (employment status), (jumped bail), f, (dangerousness), (white-collar crime),
£9 (prior record), ij3 (statutory seriousness), and ij4 (severity of bail outcome).

likelihood-ratio chi-square test statistics with their associated degrees of
freedom for each cross-group test of invariance and the probability level
for each test. It should be noted that with cross-group comparisons it
becomes necessary statistically to place equality constraints on indices of
constructs. Williams and Thomson (1983) point out that values of structural

coefficients are dependent on how one chooses to normalize the constructs.
Table IV. Correlation Matrix for White Male Felony Defendants in Ten Federal District
Courts"

f, & h S* is f6 6 & & % *74
f, 1.00
& -0.23 1.00
f3 -0.05 0.08 1.00
f4 0.02 0.27 0.13 1.00
& 0.14 0.76 0.09 0.18 1.00
f6 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 1.00
f, -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.08 1.00
& 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.16 -0.09 -0.06 1.00
(9 -0.16 -0.17 -0.11 -0.05 -0.15 0.23 0.15 -0.14 1.00

t)3 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.25 0.04 1.00

i?4 -0.11 -0.17 -0.21 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 0.14 -0.19 0.26 0.14 1.00
"Variables: (educational level), (income level), £, (length of residence), f4 (marital
status), (employment status), £6 (jumped bail), (7 (dangerousness), £s (white-collar crime),
(prior record), 773 (statutory seriousness), and i?4 (severity of bail outcome).
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Table V. Chi-Square, Degrees of Freedom, and Probability Level for Models of Invariance
Across Race Groups for Male Defendants
Model"

*2

df

P

53.65

15

0.00

2

Pooled model constraining the
indices of SR and CT to be equal
Invariance of /?41 cross groups

59.12

16

0.00

3

In variance of /?4 2 cross groups

55.10

16

0.00

4

Invariance of yib cross groups
Invariance of yA7 cross groups

56.23

16

0.00

57.42

16

0.00

6

Invariance of y4_g cross groups

56.59

16

0.00

7

Invariance of y49 cross groups
Invariance of y31 cross groups
Invariance of y3 S cross groups
Invariance of y3 9 cross groups
Invariance of f}4 3 cross groups
Pooled model with no equality constraints

1

5

8

9
10
11
12

on indices of SR and CT

70.50

16

0.00

61.53

16

0.00

54.18

16

0.00

53.68

16

0.00

81.25

16

0.00

43.78

12

0.00

"Models 1 through Model 11 estimated with equality constraints on the indices of CT and
SR. (See footnote 8 for discussion.)

Without corrections, our tests of the invariance of structural parameter
estimates would be invalid. To avoid this, we follow the strategy of placing
equality constraints across groups on our indices of stratification resources
and community ties, respectively.14
The first test of invariance we consider involves the latent variable that

is most central to this analysis, stratification resources. In Table V we see
14With our interest in group comparisons of structural parameter estimates, it becomes necessary

to test the assumption of no differences in the indicators of stratification resources and
community ties (Bielby et al., 1977; Gottfredson, 1981; Williams and Thomson, 1983). Using
LISREL, we examine whether a model placing equality constraints on the two indicators of
stratification resources and the three indicators of community ties provides a better fit to the

data than a model that allows these indices to take their respective group values. The null
hypothesis tested is Model 1 = Model 12, where Model 1 is the model of equality constraints
across groups for the parameter estimates above and Model 12 is the model of no equality
constraints for the above parameter estimates. Table VI provides the results of this test.
Model 1 produces a goodness-of-fit statistic of 53.65 with 15 degrees of freedom (P = 0.000).
Model 12 produces a goodness-of-fit statistic of 43.78 with 12 degrees of freedom (P = 0.000).
Using the test of the difference between two nested models yields a x2 of 9.87 with 3 degrees
of freedom (0.05 > P> 0.02). Given the importance of this test for later analysis, we require
the chi-square difference test to be statistically significant at P s 0.01. With this probability
level as our criterion we are unable to reject the hypothesis of no differences between the

models. We employ Model 1 as the model for our cross-group comparisons. This permits
us to test for cross-group differences in the effect of each construct with 1 degree of freedom,

rather than with 2 degrees of freedom for stratification resources and 3 degrees of freedom
for community ties.
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that Model 2, which specifies the effect of stratification resources (/?4ii) as

invariant across groups, produces a x2 = 59.12 with 16 degrees of freedom
(P = 0.000). Comparing this chi-square value with that obtained for Model
1, which specifies no equality constraints for stratification resources across

groups, produces a chi-square test value in Table VI for the difference
between M2 and Ml of 5.46 with 1 degree of freedom. This result allows
a rejection of the null hypothesis that Ml = M2 at the 0.02 level. The effect

of stratification resources on bail severity does vary across racial groups.
The parameter estimates presented in Table VII reveal that this difference
in effects is in the direction of stratification resources producing a greater

reduction in the severity of bail conditions for whites (/341 = -0.33) than
blacks (/34j1 = -0.12). That is, although both groups benefit from access to
stratification resources, whites benefit more than blacks. This finding sup
ports the assertion that the stratification of defendants in the criminal justice
system is similar to that in other institutions of allocation.

We next consider how additional legal and extralegal variables operate
across the racial groupings, beginning with the other construct included in
our model, community ties. Table V indicates that Model 3, which specifies
the effect of community ties to be invariant across groups, produces a
X2 = 55.10 with 16 degrees of freedom (P = 0.000). The chi-square difference
indicated in Table VI between Model 1 and Model 3 is 1.44 with 1 degree
of freedom, which does not allow a rejection of the null hypothesis that
Model 3 = Model 1. The legal variable community ties apparently operates
similarly for whites and blacks.
Performing the same chi-square difference test for Model 1 and Model
5 indicates that the effect of the defendant's dangerousness does not vary
across groups. Comparisons of Model 4 and Model 6 with Model 1 similarly
Table VI. Chi-Square Difference Tests of Invariance of Specific Estimates Cross
Black Male and White Male Defendants
Model tested

Ho
H0
H0
H0

Ho
Ho
H0
H0
H0

X2 difference df

P

Ml = M2

5.46 1

0.02

Ml = M3

1.44 1

0.20

Ml = M4

2.57 1

0.10 <P< 0.20

Ml = M5

3.76 1

0.05 <P< 0.10

0.05<jP<0.10

Ml = M6

2.93 1

Ml = M7

16.85 1

Ml = M8

7.87 1

Ml = M9

0.52 1

>0.70

Ml = M10

0.02 1

>0.80

Ml = Mil

27.59 1

<0.001

0.001 < P<0.01

<0.0001

Conclusion

Reject H0
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Reject H0
Reject Ho
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Reject H0
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Table VII. LISREL Estimates, Standardized Coefficients, and z Values for Parameters in
Model 1 Estimated Separately for Black and White Defendants"
White defendants

Black defendants
Vi

V2

Vs

Exogenous variables
1.00
it

1.00

1.21

1.21

0.15

0.15

(0.54)

(0.54)
|3
&

1.00

1.00

0.93

0.93

0.35

0.35
0.16

0.16

(2.97)*

(2.97)*

0.57

0.57

0.26

0.16

(3.17)*

(3.17)*
<T6

0.86

0.45

0.09

0.05

(2.84)**

(4.40)***
f7

1.06

1.59

3.98

0.03

0.10

0.10

(1.38)
(»

(5-27)***

(5.61)***

2.41
0.14

(8.35)***

-4.50

-0.74

-4.10

-0.34

-0.22

-0.08

-0.20

-0.04

(13.46)***
6

V*

Vi

0.96

0.96
e.2

V2

V4

(5.27)***

(9.17)***

(179)

-0.09

2.58

-0.003

1.10

-0.003

0.18

-0.001

0.08

(0.13)

(9.51)***

(0.004)

(4.67)***

Engodenous variables
-0.33

-0.12

Vt

0.04

-0.10

(2.25)*

(4.89)***

-0.58

1)2

-0.66

-0.22

-0.25

(12.66)***

(12.38)***

0.04

0.05

0.10

0.11

(5.43)***

(5.92)***

Error
disturbances 0

43.09

6.77

43.49

"Order of reported findings: LISREL estimates, standardized coefficients, z values.
*P<0.05.
**P<0.01.
***P< 0.001.
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indicate that the effects of the defendant's record of bail jumping and type

of charge are invariant across groups. Dangerousness, jumping bail, and
being charged with a conventional crime all have negative effects that are
commensurate for white and black defendants in terms of increasing bail
severity.

We turn now to the effects of having a record of prior adult felony
convictions. Model 7 constrains the effect of such a record to be invariant

across groups and produces a *2 = 70.50 with 16 degrees of freedom (P =
0.000). Referring to Table VII we see that the obtained x2 of 16.85 for the
difference in Models 1 and 7 with 1 degree of freedom allows rejection of
the null hypothesis that M7 = M1 at the P< 0.001 level of significance.
Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that a prior record of adult felony

conviction operates differently for whites and blacks. Table VII indicates
the source that prior felony conviction produces a greater severity of bail
outcome for black (y4>9 = 2.58) than white defendants (y4>9=1.10). Both
groups pay for these convictions, but blacks pay more.
Finally, we consider the tests for the cross-group comparisons of
coefficients affecting statutory seriousness of the offense (173) and the effects

of statutory seriousness on bail severity. The first two tests, involving the
null hypotheses that Ml = M9 and Ml = M10, yield nonsignificant results.
This indicates that the effects of type of charge and prior record of felony
convictions on statutory seriousness of the offense do not vary across racial
groups. However, the statistically significant chi-square difference statistic

for the comparison of Model 8 with Model 1 indicates that the effect of
dangerousness on statutory severity (y3>7) does vary across race groups.
Referring to Table VII, we see that dangerousness produces an effect of
y3>7=1.06 (P<0.001) for black defendants, but for white defendants the
effect is much stronger, y3j7 = 3.98 (P< 0.001). Clearly, dangerousness of
the defendant results in a higher statutory severity for white defendants
than for black defendants, contrary to expectations derived from labeling
or conflict theory.
Referring to Table VII, the effect of statutory seriousness on bail severity

also varies across groups. Table VI indicates that Model 11, which specifies
an invariance in the effects of statutory seriousness across groups, is sig
nificantly different from Model 1, which allows this effect to vary. The null
hypothesis of no difference is rejected. Finally, in Table VII we see that the
difference observed is in the form of the statutory seriousness of the offense

charged having a greater influence on the bail severity for white than for
black defendants. This finding is consistent with Farnworth and Horan's
(1980) research challenging further the conflict and labeling theory's one
dimensional characterization of disadvantage in the American criminal
justice system.
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8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this paper we have addressed two concerns. First, we have sought
to examine criminal justice decision making at the federal court level as an
allocation process based on structural principles that are similar to those
of other stratification systems. The present study of pretrial release decisions

provides considerable evidence of such an allocation process. To begin,
pretrial release decisions in the federal courts are influenced by both legal
and extralegal variables. That is, both are a part of the stratification process.

On the one hand, variables measuring weak community ties, bail jumping,
and prior felony convictions have the effects legally expected under the
Bail Reform Act, increasing the severity of pretrial release decisions. These
findings hold for estimates obtained on the joint population of defendants
(see Table II) and for estimates obtained on race specific populations (see
Table VII). On the other hand, variables measuring stratification resources,
dangerousness, and being charged with a white-collar crime have effects,
unintended by the Bail Reform Act, in effect at the time the cases were
processed.
A primary concern in this paper has been to open a new avenue of
research on criminal justice decision making by exploring a more subtle
structural principle that influences the allocation of pretrial release decisions

as well as other stratification processes. This principle is that stratification
resources, measured as a multidimensional construct with education and
income as its observed components, operate to the greater advantage of
whites than blacks. While this and previous studies have found that the
main effect of race on pretrial release decisions is negligible, with the
exception of Farnworth and Horan's (1980) research, interactions of race
with stratification resources have not been explored. As noted earlier,
Farnworth and Horan's study of race-specific effects on bail decision making

failed to estimate the effect of the defendant's dangerousness to the com
munity and the defendant's record of jumping bail—two variables central
to the decades-old debate over defining the legally relevant information to
the pretrial release decision. Our findings point to the direct and indirect
influence these variables exert on judicial discretion.
This research further indicates that the above structural principle and
the interactions it implies do indeed operate in the allocation of pretrial
release decisions. That is, stratification resources and prior record of felony
convictions act to the disadvantage of black defendants. Most significantly,

we find that, although stratification resources reduce the severity of bail
decisions for both racial groups, this influence is greater for white than for
black defendants. In other words, whites receive the greater advantages that

stratification resources provide. These findings support the white public's
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perceptions of inequality in the criminal justice system (Yankerovich, Skelly,

and White, Inc., 1977). We say more about black respondents' perceptions
below.

However, our findings suggest, contrary to conflict theory and labeling

theory, that black defendants are not always placed in a disadvantageous
position relative to whites. Our research indicates that increases in the
statutory severity of the offense produce more severe outcomes for white
defendants than their black counterparts. Moreover, the greater effect of
dangerousness on statutory severity for white defendants further contributes

to the disadvantage produced by the effect of statutory severity on bail
outcome. These findings point to the importance of including information
on the defendant's dangerousness in any analysis of race-specific effects on

the pretrial release decision.
Our second concern has been to research further the relationship
between law and legal practices. Analyzing federal magistrate decision
making occurring prior to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, we found that
information on the defendant's dangerousness was routinely used to increase

the severity of bail decisions. Inclusion of this information was in conflict
with the Bail Reform Act of 1966 then in effect. Based on these findings
we suggest that; consistent with Bohannon's (1965) assertion concerning a
role of law, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 served to reinstitutionalize magis
trate norms regarding the operational definition of justice at the bail stage

of case processing. These findings are generalizable to federal case process
ing. Whether these findings apply to state court decision making remains
to be investigated.
Returning to our initial interest, the finding that stratification resources

work to the greater advantage of whites than blacks helps to make sense
of prior research on public perceptions of the criminal justice system. Hagan

and Albonetti (1982) report from an analysis of a national sample of
Americans that blacks, and especially blacks who have achieved a position
in the professional managerial class, perceive that the criminal justice system
works to their relative disadvantage. Yet criminal justice research repeatedly

casts doubt on such perceptions, finding negligible main effects of race on
outcomes (e.g., Kleck, 1981). Our findings suggest an explanation of this
paradox. It may be that the influence of race is more complicated than
previously recognized, operating in interaction with stratification resources

and other legal and extralegal variables. Our findings in particular point to
a clear reason why blacks in the professional managerial class perceive so
much criminal injustice: in our data, stratification resources simply do not
bring the same return in the allocation of pretrial release decisions for
blacks as for whites. The lesson seems to be this: as in other stratification
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systems, white defendants in the criminal justice system receive better returns
on their resources.
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